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ABSTRACT 
 
We empirically test the association between conditional conservatism and cost of equity capital. 
Conditional conservatism imposes stronger verification requirements for the recognition of 
economic gains than economic losses, resulting in earnings that reflect losses faster than gains. 
This asymmetric reporting of gains and losses is predicted to lower firm cost of equity capital by 
increasing bad news reporting precision, thereby reducing information uncertainty (Guay and 
Verrecchia 2007) and the volatility of future stock prices (Suijs 2008). Using standard asset-
pricing tests, we find a significant negative relation between conditional conservatism and excess 
average stock returns over the period 1975-2003. This evidence is corroborated by further tests 
on the association between conditional conservatism and measures of implied cost of capital 
derived from analysts’ forecasts. 
 
Keywords:  Conditional conservatism, asymmetric reporting, cost of capital, 
information precision, uncertainty. 
Data Availability: Data is available from the sources identified in the paper. 
JEL Classification:  G10, G38, M41. 
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1. Introduction 
We examine the association between conditional accounting conservatism and cost of equity 
capital. Conditional conservatism imposes stronger verification requirements for the recognition 
of economic gains than economic losses, generating earnings that reflect bad news in a timelier 
fashion than good news. This is referred to as the asymmetric timeliness of earnings (Basu 
1997). Recent analytical work by Guay and Verrecchia (2007) and Suijs (2008) coincides in 
arguing that asymmetric reporting can affect firm’s market value and its cost of equity capital. 
These authors analytically demonstrate that more precise bad news reporting reduces (i) the 
discount investors apply to firm value in the presence of uncertainty; and (ii) the volatility of 
future stock prices (and thus, shareholders’ investment risk). In this paper, we empirically test 
this proposition and provide evidence on the negative association between asymmetric reporting 
and cost of equity capital. 
Guay and Verrecchia (2007) articulate the mechanism underlying the predicted relation 
between conditional conservatism and cost of capital. They show that firm commitment to timely 
reporting of low realizations leads to full disclosure of information and to lower cost of capital. 
In their model, uncertainty about the information structure leads to the appearance of risk 
premiums as investors place less weight on imprecise information signals (Merton 1987; Easley 
and O’Hara 2004; Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia 2008), and full disclosure of information 
reduces the uncertainty about expected future cash flows, lowering cost of capital. Full 
disclosure is achieved via timely recognition of difficult-to-verify losses in the audited financial 
statements combined with voluntary strategic disclosure of good news through various other 
information channels, which are expected to flourish in the presence of conservative reporting 
(LaFond and Watts 2008).  
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Suijs (2008) suggests an alternative link between firm reporting policy and cost of 
capital. In his model, overlapping generations of shareholders invest in a firm with a life cycle 
that exceeds shareholders’ investment horizons. In such a setting, it is the volatility of firm future 
prices that determines investment risk and not the volatility of future cash flows. As a result, firm 
reporting policies become a primary determinant of investment risk. More informative disclosure 
of bad news reduces the cost of capital by improving risk sharing across generations of investors. 
Suijs (2008) demonstrates that an asymmetric reporting system that reports bad news more 
precisely than good news results in higher firm value and more efficient risk sharing. 
Whilst regulators and corporate executives appear to believe that accounting decisions 
can have cost of capital effects (Levitt 1998; Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal 2005), recent work 
on the association between financial information attributes and cost of capital presents mixed 
theories and conflicting evidence (Easley and O’Hara 2004; Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia 2007; 
Core, Guay and Verdi 2008; Hughes, Liu and Liu 2009). We add to this prior literature by 
empirically testing the proposition in Guay and Verrecchia (2007) and Suijs (2008) that 
conditional conservatism leads to lower cost of capital. 1 With the exception of some limited 
evidence in Francis, LaFond, Olsson and Schipper (2004), no prior study has analyzed the 
association between conditional conservatism and cost of capital. 
Using a large sample of US firms for the period 1975 to 2003, we create and validate a  
firm-specific measure of conservatism (Conservatism) based on the work of Callen, Segal and 
Hope (2009). We use this proxy in asset-pricing regressions to test whether more conditionally 
conservative firms experience lower expected stock returns. The asset-pricing tests yield the 
following key evidence. We document a significant and negative coefficient on the Conservatism 
                                                 
1 For brevity, we sometimes refer to conditional conservatism simply as conservatism. Similarly, we use the terms 
cost of capital and cost of equity capital interchangeably. 
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portfolio in a firm-specific time series regression that correlates returns contemporaneously with 
Conservatism, the three Fama and French (1993) risk factors (beta, size and book-to-market) and 
a momentum factor (Carhart 1997). Second, we examine whether a strategy that buys (sells) 
firms with high (low) Conservatism earns abnormal returns. We find that the Conservatism 
hedge portfolio strategy yields significantly negative abnormal excess returns. Finally, we build a 
Conservatism mimicking portfolio called AMC (Aggressive minus Conservative) by subtracting 
each month the value-weighted return of stocks in the highest 3 deciles of Conservatism from the 
value-weighted return of stocks in the lowest 3 deciles of Conservatism. Using a two-stage cross-
sectional regression technique extensively used in the finance literature, we show that the AMC 
factor loading is significantly positive on a cross-sectional regression of portfolio returns on 
AMC, momentum and the three Fama and French factor loadings.  
We check the robustness of our findings in several ways. First, we assess the construct 
validity of the Callen et al. (2009) conservatism proxy. Second, we provide empirical evidence 
consistent with the analytical frameworks of Guay and Verrecchia (2007) and Suijs (2008) that 
conditional conservatism is associated to lower earnings forecast errors and lower future returns 
volatility. Finally, following prior work by Francis et al. (2004) among others, we assess the 
association between conservatism and cost of capital as measured by the expected return of a 
firm’s stock implicit in analysts’ forecasts. To do so, we regress a measure of implied cost of 
capital on Conservatism, risk proxies and controls for the determinants of conditional 
conservatism. This provides additional indirect evidence of the link between conditional 
conservatism and cost of equity. The results from these tests corroborate the findings from the 
asset-pricing tests.  
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Overall, we document a robust negative association between conditional conservatism 
and cost of capital, consistent with the propositions in Guay and Verrecchia (2007) and Suijs 
(2008). Our results add to the recent stream of empirical literature on the cost of capital effects of 
variation in accounting quality,2 and contribute to a flourishing stream of empirical research in 
accounting conservatism that shows that conditional conservatism is associated to positive 
economic outcomes (Bushman, Piotroski and Smith 2007; Ahmed and Duellman 2008; LaFond 
and Watts, 2008; Francis and Martin 2010). The reported evidence sheds some additional light 
on the regulatory debate on whether conservatism should be excluded from the desirable 
qualitative characteristics of accounting information.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains the discussion on 
the expected relation between conservatism and cost of equity and reviews prior work on the 
topic. Section 3 describes the asset pricing tests to empirically analyze this relation, the empirical 
measure of conditional conservatism that we use in our tests, and how we validate this 
conservatism measure. Section 4 presents the data and the empirical results. Section 5 discusses 
the robustness tests. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the findings and concludes. 
 
2. The association between conditional conservatism and cost of capital 
Conditional conservatism, defined following Basu (1997) as the implementation of more 
stringent verifiability criteria for the recognition of good news than bad news in earnings, is one 
of the most pervasive characteristics of accounting information. This pervasiveness is explained 
                                                 
2 See Botosan (1997), Botosan and Plumlee (2002), Battacharya, Daouk and Welker (2003), Francis et al. (2004, 
2005), Hribar and Jenkins (2004), Aboody, Hughes and Liu (2005), Kravet and Shevlin (2007), Francis, Nanda and 
Olsson (2008), Core et al. (2008), Daske, Hail, Leuz and Verdi (2008), McInnis (2010), Barth, Konchitchki and 
Landsman (2010). The evidence presented by this literature is somewhat mixed, which is partly attributable to the 
different empirical methods used, as well as the use of accounting quality proxies, such as disclosure, transparency 
or income smoothing, with a tenuous link with information precision about future cash flows. 
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by the expected benefits of conditional conservatism for the different parties to the firm. Prior 
literature on conservatism highlights the benefits of conservatism in contracting (Watts 2003). 
Conditional conservatism acts as a governance mechanism that benefits both debt and equity 
holders and increases firm value.3 Watts (2003) maintains that this increase in firm value is 
achieved by minimizing contracting, litigation, regulatory and taxation costs. In addition to these 
contracting benefits of conservatism, LaFond and Watts (2008, 448) argue that conditional 
conservatism is expected to “lower information asymmetry between managers and outside 
investors”, and (p. 450) that “conservative financial reports are likely to generate a more 
informed capital market.” 
Furthering our understanding of the role of conditional conservatism in improving the 
functioning of capital markets, Guay and Verrecchia (2007, 3) make the argument that the 
preference for an asymmetric reporting system “lies in the discount the market applies to 
uncertainty in the absence of information.” They argue that managers have incentives to act 
strategically and disclose information only on good prospects and high realizations (Dye 2001). 
In the absence of regulatory enforcement of conservative reporting, managers recognize good 
news in earnings on a timely basis and voluntarily disclose higher bounds for future expected 
cash flows. However, they shy away from full disclosure by deferring the recognition of 
difficult-to-verify losses and withholding information about low realizations of expected future 
cash flows. Guay and Verrecchia (2007) develop a model where markets anticipate strategic 
disclosure and apply a discount if there is certainty that management is withholding information. 
                                                 
3 Consistent with this view, Beekes, Pope and Young (2004), Ahmed and Duellman (2007) and Garcia Lara, Garcia 
Osma and Penalva (2009a) show that better governed firms report more conditionally conservative numbers, whilst 
the work of Ball, Robin and Sadka (2008) confirms that both debt and equity markets demand conservative 
accounting. 
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Against this backdrop, when conservative reporting is enforced, the market can be certain that no 
information is withheld.  
Guay and Verrecchia (2007) analytically demonstrate that a commitment to an 
asymmetric reporting system permits attaining full disclosure. Good and bad news is disclosed 
on a timely basis, although through different communication channels. Bad news is recognized 
in the income statement, while good news is disclosed through other channels like the notes to 
the financial statements, conference calls, etc. These sources of information flourish under 
conservatism (LaFond and Watts 2008). Under full disclosure, market participants have timely 
information both on the lower and upper bounds of firm future cash flows. This reduces 
information uncertainty and increases the precision with which investors can assess firm future 
cash flows, minimizing the discount markets apply to firm value. Consistent with this view, 
Lambert et al. (2007, 2008) show that, more generally, by improving accounting information 
quality, managers increase the precision with which market participants can assess firm future 
cash flows and thus reduce cost of capital. They demonstrate that this effect is not diversifiable, 
even in large economies. Along these lines, it is not unreasonable to assume that conservatism is 
so embedded into financial reporting practices that diversification may not be possible.  
Conditional conservatism is also expected to increase firm value indirectly through 
improved monitoring and contracting, and reduced litigation costs. As shown by Guay and 
Verrecchia (2007) conservatism increases firm value (i) by improving corporate governance 
(which, in turn, allows early removal of poorly performing managers, prevents managers from 
engaging in self-serving projects and expropriating investors, improves firm investment 
efficiency, etc.), (ii) by reducing agency costs arising from compensation and debt contracting; 
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and (iii) by reducing litigation costs. These arguments link to the work in Lambert et al. (2007), 
who show that there is also an indirect link between information quality and cost of equity.  
Finally, Suijs (2008) provides an alternative link between conservatism, information 
precision and cost of capital. He builds a model of overlapping generations of shareholders that 
invest in a firm with a life cycle that exceeds shareholders’ investment horizons. In that setting, 
investment risk is determined by the dispersion of future stock prices, and not by the volatility of 
future cash flows. Suijs (2008) demonstrates that an asymmetric reporting system that reports 
bad news more precisely than good news results in higher firm value and more efficient risk 
sharing amongst generations of investors. Suijs argues that firm reporting policies are a primary 
determinant of investment risk, and that a conservative reporting system serves to reduce this 
risk, thereby lowering firm cost of capital. 
There is little prior empirical research on this topic. Only the work of Francis et al. (2004) 
examines the relation between cost of equity capital and conditional conservatism at the firm-
year level. They study the link between cost of capital and seven earnings attributes: accrual 
quality, persistence, predictability, smoothness, value relevance, timeliness, and conservatism. 
They hypothesize and find that, generally, more favorable values of the individual earnings 
attributes are associated with lower cost of capital, after controlling for known risks factors and 
innate determinants of the earnings attributes. However, they do not find evidence of an 
association between conservatism and cost of equity. Their result of no relation is probably 
driven by measurement error in their firm-level proxy of conservatism, as demonstrated by 
Givoly, Hayn and Natarajan (2007), and by the use of tests that rely solely on the use of ex-ante 
cost of capital estimates that have been shown to be unduly affected by optimism in analysts’ 
earnings forecasts (Easton and Sommers 2007). More recently, Li (2009) studies the effect of 
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conditional conservatism on the cost of debt and equity capital at the country level. Using an 
empirical design based on the classical Basu (1997) model and ex-ante measures of the cost of 
equity, she finds that firms from countries with more conservative financial reporting systems 
have significantly lower cost of debt and equity, after controlling for differences in legal 
institutions and securities regulations. We depart from Francis et al. (2004) and Li (2009) in 
three main dimensions: (a) we use a firm-level measure of conditional conservatism (as in Callen 
et al. 2009) to overcome the possible biases in the Basu (1997) measure described by Dietrich, 
Muller and Riedl (2007), Givoly et al. (2007) and Patatoukas and Thomas (2009); (b) we do not 
rely on ex-ante measures of the cost of equity; and (c) we use formal asset pricing tests widely 
use in the finance literature.  
 
3. Research design 
Aboody et al. (2005), Francis et al. (2005), Core et al. (2008), Francis et al. (2008) and McInnis 
(2010) use asset-pricing tests to assess whether accounting choice affects firm cost of capital. We 
follow their approach and study (i) whether conditional conservatism is associated with future 
firm-specific and portfolio excess returns; and (ii) whether conditional conservatism is a priced 
factor in a Fama and French (1993) factor model setting, using the two-stage cross sectional 
regression method common in the finance literature after Fama and MacBeth (1973).  
 
3.1. Conditional conservatism and future excess returns 
As a first test, we study whether conditional conservatism predicts future excess returns. To do 
so, we regress firm-specific future excess returns on firm characteristics and conditional 
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conservatism (Conservatism). We match annual estimates of beta, size, book-to-market, 
momentum and Conservatism to monthly returns in the next 12 months starting 4 months after 
the fiscal year end. That is, for December fiscal year ends we collect monthly returns from April 
of year t+1 to March of year t+2. The model is run monthly as follows: 
Ri,t+1 – RF,t+1 = α + β1 Betat + β2 Sizet + β3 BMt + β4 Momentumt + 
+ β5 Conservatismt + µt            (1) 
where monthly excess returns (Ri,t+1 – RF,t+1) are measured in percentages and are calculated as 
the raw stock return less the risk-free rate. The raw stock return is obtained from the CRSP 
monthly stock file and the risk-free rate is the return on the 1-month T-bill obtained from the 
Fama-French files at WRDS. Beta is the slope coefficient from a regression of a firm’s monthly 
excess returns on the monthly value-weighted market excess return over a rolling 60-month 
window ending in the current fiscal year. Size is the natural log of the market value of equity 
measured at the end of the year. BM is the log of the book-to-market value of equity ratio. 
Momentum is the buy-and-hold return for the 11-month period ending one month prior to the end 
of the year. We include momentum in all our tests because high conservatism firms are more 
likely to have negative returns and we want to ensure that the results are not an artifact of 
momentum. Conservatism is the monthly decile ranks of the three-year average of the firm-year 
specific proxy of conditional conservatism developed in Callen et al. (2009). Section 3.3 below 
provides further details on the calculation and validation of Conservatism as a firm-specific 
proxy for conditional conservatism. In model (1) the main coefficient of interest is β5. If 
conditional conservatism lowers cost of equity capital, this will lead to lower future excess 
returns and to a significantly negative β5 coefficient. 
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As a second test, we follow a similar approach to the one in Gompers, Ishii and Metrick. 
(2003), Aboody et al. (2005), Core et al. (2008) and Francis et al. (2008) and test whether an 
investment strategy that buys (sells) firms in the decile with the largest (smallest) conditional 
conservatism Conservatism earns negative abnormal returns. To perform this test, each month, 
from 1/1/76 to 12/31/04 (348 months), all firm-years in the sample are ranked into 10 deciles 
based on their Conservatism value. Portfolios of stocks are then formed for each Conservatism 
decile. Then, for every Conservatism decile, we estimate the following time series regression of 
monthly value-weighted portfolio returns on the three Fama and French (1993) factors and a 
momentum factor: 
RP,t – RF,t = α + β1 (RM,t – RF,t) + β2 SMBt + β3 HMLt + β4 UMDt + µt         (2) 
where RP–RF equals the value-weighted return on the portfolios less the risk free rate. RM–RF is 
the excess return on the value-weighted market portfolio. SML is the value-weighted size-
mimicking portfolio return. HML is the value-weighted BM-mimicking portfolio return. UMD is 
the value-weighted momentum-mimicking portfolio. RM–RF, SMB, HML and UMD are obtained 
directly from WRDS. Monthly returns are measured in percentages. The main coefficient of 
interest in equation (2) is the intercept. If the model is well specified, the intercept should be very 
close to zero and insignificant. However, if the variable used to create the portfolios is priced by 
the market (or the market is mispricing the information, as in Sloan 1996) then the intercept 
should be significantly different from zero. The intercept of the hedge portfolio indicates whether 
abnormal returns can be obtained buying and selling short the extreme portfolios formed with the 
variable of interest (in this case, conservatism). If conservatism results in lower cost of capital, 
we expect the intercept α of the hedge portfolio to be significantly negative. 
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3.2. Two-stage cross-sectional regressions 
The prior tests do not allow us to disentangle whether market participants reward conditionally 
conservative firms or whether they do not fully impound differences in conditional conservatism 
into prices. To test whether conservatism is a priced risk factor, we use a two-stage cross-
sectional regression approach, where we regress the excess returns of a set of test assets on the 
Fama-French risk factors betas, a momentum beta and the beta of a conservatism factor 
(Cochrane 2005, chapter 12). The idea is to check whether the hypothesized factor contributes to 
explain the cross-section of asset returns. Using the prior data, each month, we form a factor-
mimicking portfolio called AMC (Aggressive minus Conservative). To calculate AMC, at the 
beginning of every month we sort firms into Conservatism deciles. For example, for April of 
year t, firms are ranked into deciles based on the Conservatism value calculated using annual 
data for fiscal year ends between January and December of year t-1. Monthly returns of each 
decile portfolio are calculated as the value-weighted average of excess returns of the firms in the 
portfolio. To construct AMC, each month, the value-weighted return of stocks in the highest 3 
deciles of Conservatism is subtracted from the value-weighted return on stocks in the lowest 3 
deciles of Conservatism. That is, we buy the 3 deciles with the least conservative firms and sell 
the 3 deciles with the most conservative firms. We use value-weighted portfolios to reduce the 
upward biases in returns that arise when rebalancing equal-weight portfolios (Blume and 
Stambaugh 1983). 
In the first stage of the test, we incorporate the AMC factor-mimicking portfolio to the 
Fama and French (1993) three factor model plus a momentum factor, to estimate the betas from 
each factor. The augmented model is as follows: 
RP,t – RF,t = α + βRM–RF (RM,t – RF,t) + βSMB SMBt + βHML HMLt + 
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+ βUMD UMDt + βAMC AMCt + µt            (3) 
In the second stage, we regress mean excess returns on the risk factor betas estimated 
from equation (3) using the following model: 
R P,t – R F,t = α + δ1 βˆ RM–RF + δ2 βˆ SMB + δ3 βˆ HML + δ4 βˆ UMD + δ5 βˆ AMC + µt         (4) 
Because betas in the second-stage regression are estimated betas (derived from equation 3), there 
is a potential error-in-variables problem that may bias the standard errors of the second-stage 
regression coefficients. To mitigate this concern, we apply the correction proposed by Shanken 
(1992) to adjust for the overstated precision of the Fama–MacBeth standard errors. Equation (3) 
is estimated in time-series at the portfolio level. We follow standard finance literature and use as 
test assets the 25 size and book-to-market portfolios created by Fama and French (1993), which 
they make available through Ken French’s website.4 These 25 portfolios have become the 
standard benchmark in testing competing asset pricing models (Petkova 2006). These test assets 
are extremely challenging and for this reason they are widely used. We also use as test assets a 
set of 25 portfolios from the intersection of the quintiles of Size with the quintiles of Momentum, 
also available in Ken French’s website.5 If conditional conservatism is a priced risk factor, then, 
portfolios with a larger βˆ AMC should obtain larger abnormal returns. If this is the case, the δ5 
coefficient in equation (4) is predicted to be significantly positive. 
 
                                                 
4 See http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 
5 In additional robustness tests, we also use 25 size-conservatism portfolios, and 100 conservatism portfolios. 
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3.3. Developing and assessing the construct validity of a firm-specific measure of conditional 
conservatism (Conservatism) 
We construct our empirical proxy of conditional conservatism based on the firm-year specific 
ratio of conditional conservatism (CR) developed by Callen et al. (2009).6 CR captures the 
percentage of a shock to current and future firm earnings that is incorporated into current period 
unexpected earnings. Callen et al. (2009) base their measure on the Vuolteenaho (2002) return 
decomposition model. Vuolteenaho (2002) shows that shocks to returns can be decomposed into: 
(1) shocks to current and future dividends (or cash flows), and (2) shocks to current and future 
discount rates. Replacing dividends with earnings through the clean surplus relation, shocks to 
returns can be expressed in terms of shocks to current and expected future earnings and shocks to 
current and future discount rates: 
rt – Et-1(rt) = Ne – Nr                           (5) 
where r is the market rate of return, Ne is earnings news (shocks) and Nr is discount rates news 
(shocks). The above equation shows that unexpected revision to current stock returns increases 
with earnings news and decreases with discount rate news. The conservatism ratio (CR) 
developed in Callen et al. (2009) measures the relation between earnings news (Ne) and current 
period unexpected earnings. CR captures the fact that the asymmetric properties of conservative 
accounting, along with the existence of alternative non-accounting sources of information, 
generate nonlinear relations between revisions to equity returns and earnings news. CR measures 
the asymmetry between gain and loss recognition timeliness because in the case of adverse 
earnings news, a higher proportion of the news is recognized in current earnings. 
                                                 
6 There is an alternative firm-year specific measure of conservatism (c-score) developed by Khan and Watts (2009). 
Although it is a perfectly valid measure, we choose not to use c-score in our tests because it is a linear combination 
of size, market-to-book and leverage. These three variables are proxies for risk and the results could be attributed to 
c-score being a proxy for these three risk factors. 
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To obtain proxies for earnings news and current period unexpected earnings, Callen et al. 
implement the Vuolteenaho (2002) decomposition using a log-linear vector autoregressive 
(VAR) model consisting of the following system of equations, where the firm subscript, i, is 
understood: 
rt = α1 rt-1 + α2 roet-1 + α3 bmt-1 + η1t                       (6a) 
roet = β1 rt-1 + β2 roet-1 + β3 bmt-1 + η2t                       (6b) 
bmt = δ1 rt-1 + δ2 roet-1 + δ3 bmt-1 + η3t           (6c) 
using the VAR matrix of estimated coefficients from the system of equations (6) and the vectors 
of residuals η, Callen et al. arrive at the following expressions for the unexpected shock to 
returns, discount rate news (Nr) and earnings news (Ne): 
rt – Et-1(rt) =  η1,t                           (7a) 
Nrt = e1’ρA(I – ρA)-1 ηi,t                         (7b) 
Net = e2’(I – ρA)-1 ηi,t                          (7c) 
where A is the matrix of estimated coefficients from system of equations (6), e1’ and e2’ are 
vectors equal to [1, 0, 0] and [0, 1, 0] respectively, I is the identity matrix, ρ is a constant equal to 
0.967, and ηi,t = [η1i,t, η2i,t, η3i,t]’. Finally, taking the residuals from equation (6b) as their proxy 
for current period unexpected earnings, they empirically estimate the level of conditional 
conservatism as the ratio of unexpected current earnings to total earnings news: 
CRi,t = η2 i,t / Nei,t                            (8) 
Larger values of CR indicate greater conditional conservatism: in the event of a negative 
earnings shock, a larger part of the earnings shock (Ne) is reflected in current period unexpected 
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earnings (η2). In the extreme (CR=1), current period unexpected earnings fully reflect the 
earnings shock. Thus the ratio measures the proportion of the total shock to current and expected 
future earnings (cash flows) recognized in current year earnings. As stated in Callen et at. (2009), 
“by this criterion, firm A is more conservative than firm B, if for a given negative (positive) 
shock to current and future expected cash flows, firm A recognizes more (less) of the shock in 
current year earnings than does firm B”. 
 To compute CR we follow scrupulously the estimation details described in Callen et al. 
(2009). In particular, the return variable r equals the log of one plus the annual return ending 
three months after closing minus the log of one plus the annualized three-month T-bill rate. The 
earnings variable roe is the log of one plus ROE minus the log of one plus the annualized three 
month T-bill rate. ROE is computed as income before extraordinary items scaled by beginning 
book value of equity. The book-to-market variable bm equals the log of the book-to market ratio 
at year end. To control for industry effects, the VAR system is estimated for each Fama and 
French (1997) industry group using weighted least squares with one pooled regression per 
system equation. Each annual cross-section is weighted equally by deflating the data by the 
number of firms in that year and all variables in the system are demeaned.7 Finally, we remove 
firms with market value of equity below $10 million, financial firms (SIC 6000-6999), and 
observations in the top and bottom 1% of each variable. As in Callen et al. (2009), we drop firm 
year observations with a negative CR. 
                                                 
7 The precise estimation details are available in Callen and Segal (2009). We also appreciate the technical assistance 
provided by Dan Segal. 
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3.3.1. Assessment of the construct validity of the conservatism proxy  
To capture persistence in firms’ reporting choices, our conservatism proxy (Conservatism) is 
measured as the three-year average of CR.8 To assess the validity of Conservatism as a proxy for 
conditional conservatism, we replicate the procedures and variable measurement in Callen et al. 
(2009), and construct the three year averages of CR for all non-financial firms with the necessary 
data available in COMPUSTAT and CRSP for the period 1975-2003. Our resulting sample 
contains 54,389 firm-year observations, after deleting the top and bottom percentiles of CR. 
Table 1 contains sample descriptive statistics. Although our sample differs from the one used by 
Callen et al. (2009) and we measure the conservatism ratio as a three year average, our 
descriptive evidence is very similar to what they report. The mean (median) Conservatism is 0.47 
(0.39) for our sample, whilst the mean (median) CR is 0.51 (0.39) in the sample used by Callen 
et al., which spans the period 1962 to 2006. The interpretation of Conservatism is that, on 
average, a 47% of the shock to current and future earnings (the earnings news, Ne) is 
incorporated into current unexpected earnings. As expected, total accruals are on average 
negative, due to the effect of depreciation and amortization charges, the market-to-book ratio is 
well above one, suggesting the presence of unconditional conservatism, and special items are on 
average negative, consistent with the results in Callen et al. (2009). 
To assess the validity of our proxy, we regress the decile-ranks of Conservatism on the 
economic determinants of conditional conservatism. In particular, we expect conditional 
conservatism to be positively related to (i) contracting pressures and (ii) litigation risk, and 
negatively related to (iii) unconditional conservatism, (iv) total accruals and (v) special items.  
                                                 
8 All our inferences remain unchanged if we set the value of Conservatism equal to the firm-year specific CR. For 
the single-year CR, our descriptive statistics are virtually identical to those reported in Callen et al. (2009). 
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As highlighted by Watts (2003) and demonstrated by Qiang (2007), Ball, Robin and 
Sadka (2008), and Garcia Lara et al. (2009b), among others, debt contracting is one of the main 
determinants of conditional conservatism. We use leverage as a proxy for the debt-related 
pressures faced by the firm. Consequently, if Conservatism is a good proxy for conditional 
conservatism we expect a positive association between our conservatism measure and leverage. 
Regarding litigation risk, Watts (2003) points at litigation risk as one of the main determinants of 
conditional conservatism, and empirical evidence by Qiang (2007) and Garcia Lara et al. (2009b) 
supports this hypothesis using different proxies for conditional conservatism and litigation risk. 
As a proxy for equity contracting pressures and litigation risk, we follow Callen et al. (2009), 
and use the standard deviation of returns. This is a measure of operating risk. Firms with higher 
operational uncertainty are expected to be subject to greater shareholder monitoring and 
litigation risk. Thus, if Conservatism correctly captures variation in conditional conservatism, we 
should find a positive association between the standard deviation of returns and Conservatism. 
With respect to unconditional conservatism, we follow most of prior research and measure it 
using the market-to-book ratio. As an additional proxy for unconditional conservatism that 
captures ex-ante conservative accounting choices, we also employ the Penman and Zhang (2002) 
C-score. Following Beaver and Ryan (2005), we expect a negative association between 
conditional and unconditional conservatism. Finally, prior literature expects more conditionally 
conservative firms to have more negative average accruals (Givoly and Hayn 2000) and 
conditional conservatism to be also applied through special items (Pope and Walker 1999). Thus, 
we expect a negative association between total accruals and Conservatism, and between special 
items and Conservatism. 
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We measure these variables as follows: Leverage is the ratio of interest-bearing debt to 
total assets. Returns volatility is the three-year average of the standard deviation of one year of 
daily stock returns. Market-to-book is the market-to-book value of equity ratio. Total accruals 
equals [(∆Current assets – ∆Cash) – (∆Current liabilities – ∆Short term debt) – 
Depreciation]/Average assets. Special items equal special items scaled by average total assets. 
Finally, we also control for size, defined as the log of the market value of equity. 
Table 2 presents the results of a regression of the decile ranks of Conservatism on 
leverage, total accruals, the market-to-book ratio, special items, the standard deviation of returns, 
size, and the Penman and Zhang (2002) C-Score. We employ deciles of Conservatism to reduce 
measurement error, but the inferences are similar when we use Conservatism. Following 
Petersen (2009), we estimate this regression in a pooled fashion and report t-statistics based on 
standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity, serial and cross-sectional correlation with a 
two dimensional cluster at the firm- and year-level.9 All coefficient estimates are significant 
except size, for which we did not have an ex-ante prediction, given that prior literature offers 
conflicting views on the relation between firm size and conditional conservatism. All other 
coefficients behave as expected: we find a negative coefficient for total accruals, the market-to-
book ratio, special items and unconditional conservatism (as measured through the C-Score), and 
a positive coefficient for leverage and the standard deviation of returns.10 These results suggest 
that Conservatism is a good proxy for conditional conservatism.11 
                                                 
9 We obtain similar inferences using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure. The results are also robust to the 
inclusion of industry indicator variables. 
10 Notice that special items are on average negative. Higher special items are associated with higher conservatism. 
Therefore, the coefficient on special items is expected to be negative. 
11 In additional tests to validate Conservatism, we create four portfolios of firms ranked according to Conservatism. 
For each portfolio, we estimate the cross-sectional models of (a) asymmetric persistence in income changes (Basu 
1997; Ball and Shivakumar 2005), and (b) asymmetric earnings timeliness to good and bad news (Basu 1997). 
Unreported results show that conservatism measures drawn from these models increase as we move from the least to 
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4. Asset-pricing tests data and results 
We use COMPUSTAT to extract accounting data and CRSP to extract stock market data. Our 
sample period spans 29 years, t = 1976 to 2004 (348 months from January 1976 to December 
2004).12 Table 3 reports descriptive evidence of the data used to run the asset-pricing tests. 
Panels A and B show summary statistics of the three Fama-French factors (RM-RF, SMB and 
HML), a momentum factor (UMD) and the conservatism factor AMC (Aggressive minus 
Conservative). AMC is the factor-mimicking portfolio for conditional conservatism. To construct 
AMC, each month, the value-weighted return of stocks in the highest 3 deciles of Conservatism 
is subtracted from the value-weighted return on stocks in the lowest 3 deciles of Conservatism. 
RM-RF, SMB, HML and UMD are obtained directly from the Fama-French database on WRDS.  
 Table 3 Panel A shows descriptive statistics for the AMC factor and for the three Fama-
French factors and the momentum factor. This evidence permits examining whether there is a 
significant unconditional time-series mean risk premium on the factors. The mean monthly time-
series premium for the AMC factor of 0.20% implies a mean annual risk premium of about 
2.5%, which is statistically different from zero. This evidence on the time-series mean of the 
AMC factor provides an initial estimate of the factor premium. The fact that AMC is significant 
indicates that AMC is likely to be priced (Shanken and Weinstein 2006). As expected, all other 
factors also have positive means (significantly different from zero). Panel B presents the 
correlation matrix. The only significant correlation between the AMC factor and the other factors 
is with the BM-mimicking portfolio (HML), with a correlation of -0.27 (p-val < .001). This is 
                                                                                                                                                             
the most conservative portfolio according to our Conservatism measure, confirming that our measure of conditional 
conservatism correctly classifies firms according to their level of conservative accounting. 
12 The first year is 1976 because we start measuring Conservatism in the previous year. 
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not unexpected, as to the extent that BM is a (noisy) proxy of unconditional conservatism and 
unconditional conservatism is negatively associated to conditional conservatism, sorting stocks 
on BM may partially sort stocks on Conservatism as well. The rest of correlations are similar to 
those reported in recent studies (Petkova 2006; Core et al. 2008). 
Table 4 presents results of the estimation of equation (1). Parameter estimates are time-
series averages of the parameters from 348 monthly cross-sectional regressions. Consistent with 
prior research the coefficient on Beta is insignificant, and Size (BM, Momentum) is negatively 
(positively) related to excess returns (Fama and French 1992).We report a negative relation 
between conditional conservatism and average realized stock returns (Conservatism = -0.04, t-
stat = -4.73). In terms of economic significance, this coefficient indicates that moving from the 
bottom to the top decile of Conservatism decreases the cost of equity capital by 4.14% per year. 
This provides initial evidence that conditional conservatism predicts future excess returns. 
However, as noted by Core et al. (2008) among others, the fact that Conservatism is negative and 
statistically significant in model (1) does not necessarily imply that Conservatism is a priced risk 
factor. This method does not permit disentangling whether the observed effect is driven by 
investors being rewarded for risk or simply by mispricing.  
The results of estimating equation (2) are reported in Table 5 Panels A to C. We first run 
the model including just an intercept, to see whether firms in the least conservative portfolios 
obtain greater excess returns on average. This is indeed the case, as for the hedge portfolio the 
intercept is -0.18 (t-stat = -1.95), meaning that the trading strategy of buying the more 
conservative firms and selling short the least conservative ones obtains an average raw return of  
-0.18% per month, consistent with the prior evidence of a mean annual premium of around 2%. 
This negative coefficient on the hedge portfolio suggests that firms with high Conservatism earn 
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smaller returns than firms with low Conservatism. When we introduce the excess returns on the 
market portfolio in the model, the intercept is still significant, showing that the hedge portfolio 
would obtain a negative abnormal CAPM-adjusted return of -0.16% per month. Finally, when we 
introduce all the Fama-French factors plus the momentum factor, the intercept is once more 
significant and of a similar magnitude to what was previously reported. The negative abnormal 
return of the hedge portfolio is -0.25% per month; this means that the strategy of buying a 
portfolio of firms in the top decile of conservatism and selling the bottom decile generates 
abnormal annual returns of -3.02%. These results show investors reward more conditionally 
conservative firms with a smaller cost of capital. 
As previously detailed, we carry out an additional asset-pricing test to ensure that the 
prior findings are indicative of conservatism being a priced risk factor. Table 6 contains the 
results of the two-stage estimation method explained in section 3.2 above. Panels A1, B1 and C1 
provide evidence on the first stage regression for the three sets of portfolios. For reference, Panel 
A1 shows the results of estimating equation (3) without including the conservatism factor. Panels 
B1 and C1 incorporate the conservatism factor (AMC). The coefficients for RM – RF, SMB, 
HML and UMD are similar to those reported by prior work. Regarding the coefficients on the 
AMC factor, they are significantly positive both in Panel B1 (0.09, t-stat = 3.07) and Panel C1 
(0.08, t-stat = 2.65). In all three panels we report the Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989) test on 
whether the estimated intercepts are jointly zero. The GRS test statistic should not be rejected if 
the factors explain excess returns and the model is correctly specified. The GRS test statistic is 
significantly different from zero in all Panels, however, a more detailed analysis of the individual 
intercepts reveals that only 3 (2, 3) out of the total intercepts are significantly different from zero 
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in Panel A1 (B1, C1). These findings coincide with those reported in other studies (Fama and 
French 1993; Petkova 2006; Chordia and Shivakumar 2006; Core et al. 2008). 
The regression coefficients from this model cannot be directly interpreted as evidence 
that the factor is or not priced. These coefficients simply reflect that the test assets have exposure 
to the factors. The results of the second step regression (equation 4), where we directly analyze 
whether AMC is a priced factor, are presented in Table 6 Panels A2, B2 and C2. The coefficients 
for the three Fama-French factors and momentum factor loadings are remarkably similar to those 
obtained by Core et al. (2008). Panel A2 shows the results of estimating model (4) without 
including the AMC factor loading. Panels B2 and C2 contain results for the full model. We can 
observe that the coefficient on βAMC is significantly positive both in Panel B2 (0.46, Shanken     
t-stat = 2.09) and C2 (0.85, Shanken t-stat = 2.92). The last line of Panels B2 and C2 contains a 
test of the significance in the increase in R-square when the model is compared to a simpler 
model excluding βAMC as a regressor (i.e. model A2 vs model B2). Although the increase in R-
square is modest, it is significant at conventional levels (p-val = 0.062 and 0.058, respectively). 
This evidence is consistent with conservatism being a priced factor and with investors rewarding 
firms that report conditionally conservative accounting numbers with a reduced cost of capital 
(or alternatively, with investors penalizing firms with more aggressive reporting).  
As an additional batch of robustness tests, we also use as test assets a set of 25 portfolios 
from the intersection of the quintiles of Size with the quintiles of Conservatism. Finally, we 
repeat the tests using as a test asset a set of 100 portfolios of Conservatism. The untabulated 
results are consistent across these different test asset specifications. For the 25 Size-
Conservatism portfolios, the coefficient on βAMC equals 0.21 (Shanken t-stat = 2.77), and for the 
100 Conservatism portfolios the coefficient on βAMC equals 0.19 (Shanken t-stat = 2.72). Overall, 
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the findings of our asset pricing tests are consistent with the analytical work of Guay and 
Verrecchia (2007) and Suijs (2008) in that, holding everything else constant, greater conditional 
conservatism is associated to lower cost of equity capital. 
 
5. Robustness tests 
5.1. Regression of implied cost of capital on conditional conservatism 
An alternative method to test the association between cost of capital and conditional 
conservatism is to use cost of capital estimates as measured by the expected rate of return 
implicit in analysts’ forecasts. Similar to Francis et al. (2004) we model the association between 
implied cost of capital and Conservatism and controls as follows: 
Δ log (1+rVL) = α + β Δ Conservatism + δ Δ Risk Proxies + γ Δ Controls + µ        (9) 
where rVL is a proxy of implied cost of equity capital taken from the work of Brav, Lehavy and 
Michaely (2005). We estimate model (9) in changes rather than in levels because the changes-
specification reduces the bias introduced by omitted variables that remain relatively constant 
over a period of time such as industry variables and firm specific factors. The main coefficient of 
interest in equation (9) is β, which measures the association between changes in conditional 
conservatism (Conservatism) and changes in the ex-ante cost of equity capital, controlling for 
changes in known risk factors and firm characteristics. If firms that increase conditional 
conservatism benefit from a lower implied cost of capital, β is predicted to be negative and 
significant.13  
                                                 
13 In model (9) we consider the following risk proxies: a) the CAPM beta; b) market capitalization (size); c) the 
book-to-market ratio; and d) prior price momentum. These risk proxies are measured as previously described in 
Section 3. To isolate the discretionary component of the earnings attribute of interest, Conservatism, in model (9) we 
control for the same determinants used by Francis et al. (2004): a) log of total assets; b) cash flow variability; c) 
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Unreported results show that the main coefficient of interest, Conservatism is 
significantly negative. In terms of economic significance a change in Conservatism equal to its 
inter-quartile range is associated with a reduction in the cost of capital of 3%, approximately. 
Overall, these results show that firms reporting more conditionally conservative accounting 
numbers benefit from lower implied cost of equity capital, after controlling for known risk 
factors and earnings determinants, consistent with the evidence previously reported based on 
asset-pricing tests. These results are also robust to controls for optimism in analysts’ forecasts 
(Easton and Monahan 2005; Easton and Sommers 2007), and are available upon request. 
 
5.2. The link between conditional conservatism and future returns volatility 
We partly base our expectation that conditional conservatism contributes to reduce cost of capital 
on the analytical results of Suijs (2008), who shows that conservatism is expected to reduce cost 
of capital through a decrease in future returns volatility. To empirically address whether this 
hypothesis holds true in our sample, we analyze whether current conditional conservatism leads 
to reduced returns volatility over the coming year. To do so, we use the following model, which 
we estimate in a changes-specification to reduce the effect of omitted-variables bias: 
∆ Returns volatilityt+1 = α + β ∆ Conservatismt + δ ∆ Controlst + µt        (10) 
where ∆ Returns volatilityt+1 is the change in the log of the standard deviation of one year of 
daily stock returns ending at the end of fiscal year t+1. We apply the log transformation to 
Returns volatility to reduce the influence of the high skewness of this variable. ∆ Conservatism is 
the change in our measure of conditional conservatism. As control variables, we consider the 
following determinants of future returns volatility: current returns volatility, the CAPM beta, 
                                                                                                                                                             
sales variability; d) length of the operating cycle; e) incidence of negative earnings realizations; f) intangibles 
intensity; g) absence of intangibles; h) capital intensity, and i) dividend yield.  
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size, the book-to-market ratio, momentum, the volatility of cash flows, the bid-ask spread and 
earnings smoothing. 
Table 7, Panel A contains the results of estimating equation (10). The coefficient on 
∆Conservatism is negative and significant, confirming the analytical evidence in Suijs (2008) 
that current conditional conservatism reduces future returns volatility. The economic significance 
is such that a change in Conservatism equal to its inter-quartile range (0.26) is associated with a 
reduction of 0.62% in daily returns volatility, or 9.87% annualized. To put this value in 
perspective, notice that the annualized returns volatility is 47%.  
 
5.3. The link between conditional conservatism and analysts’ forecast errors 
Our expectation that conditional conservatism contributes to reduce cost of capital is also based 
on the analytical results of Guay and Verrecchia (2007), who show that conditional conservatism 
is expected to reduce cost of capital through a reduction in information uncertainty. This 
reduction in information uncertainty increases the precision with which investors can assess firm 
future cash flows, minimizing the discount markets apply to firm value. To empirically test this 
proposition, we analyze whether current conservatism, as measured through our Conservatism 
measure, leads to reduced analysts’ forecast errors. To do so, we use the following model, which 
we estimate in a changes-specification to reduce the effect of omitted-variables bias: 
∆ Forecast error = α + β ∆ Conservatism + δ ∆ Controls + µ        (11) 
where ∆ Forecast error is the change in the log of analysts’ forecast error. The forecast error is 
measured as the absolute value of the difference between the mean forecast of earnings-per-share 
(EPS) and the actual EPS, scaled by the actual EPS. The forecast is taken in the tenth month of 
the fiscal year t from IBES summary data. We apply the log transformation to Forecast error to 
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reduce the influence of the high skewness of this variable. ∆ Conservatism is the change in our 
measure of conditional conservatism. The set of controls includes size (a proxy for the number of 
analysts following) and forecast variability. Forecast variability is the standard deviation of the 
earnings forecasts. We impose a minimum of 3 earnings forecasts per firm-year. Including 
additional control variables does not significantly affect the inferences. 
Table 7, Panel B contains the results of estimating equation (11). The reduced availability 
of forecast errors, together with the fact that we take changes in specifying the model, reduces 
the sample size to 15,388 observations. The coefficient on ∆ Conservatism is negative and 
significant, confirming the analytical predictions of Guay and Verrecchia (2007) that conditional 
conservatism reduces investors’ uncertainty, in this case by reducing analysts’ forecast errors. 
The economic significance of our result is such that a change in Conservatism equal to its inter-
quartile range (0.26) is associated with an average reduction of 5.8% in the forecast error. To put 
this value in perspective, Table 1 shows that the average forecast error is 29%. 
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
We empirically test the association between conditional conservatism and firm cost of equity 
capital. We run two sets of tests. First, we study if more conditionally conservative firms earn 
lower expected returns, using asset-pricing tests commonly used in the finance literature. 
Second, we analyze the association between conditional conservatism and a measure of implied 
cost of capital. Both sets of tests produce corroborative evidence, showing a significant negative 
relation between conditional conservatism and cost of equity capital. This association is robust to 
the use of different testing methodologies and measurement procedures. Our evidence thus 
confirms the hypotheses of prior analytical research by Guay and Verrecchia (2007) and Suijs 
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(2008) who argue that conservative reporting leads to increased information precision, increases 
in firm value and reductions in firm cost of equity capital, by reducing (i) uncertainty about the 
amount and distribution of future cash flows, and (ii) the volatility of future stock prices.  
 Our results add to a flourishing stream of empirical research in accounting conservatism 
that shows that conditional conservatism is associated to positive economic outcomes: lower 
information asymmetry problems (LaFond and Watts 2008), improved investment efficiency 
(Bushman et al. 2007; Ahmed and Duellman 2008), and better governance (Ahmed and 
Duellman 2007, Garcia Lara et al. 2009a). The documented negative association between 
conditional conservatism and cost of capital adds some additional light to the regulatory debate 
on whether conservatism should be excluded from the desirable qualitative characteristics of 
accounting information. Our results indicate that without properly enforced conservatism in 
accounting, firm disclosure is less precise. This, in turn, may lead to greater uncertainty, greater 
volatility of future prices, lower market values and increased cost of capital. 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive statistics of the conservatism proxy and the variables of interest for the construct-validity tests 
 
Variable description Mean St. Dev p25 p50 p75 
Conservatism 0.47 0.36 0.28 0.39 0.54 
Leverage  0.22 0.17 0.07 0.21 0.34 
Total accruals -0.03 0.09 -0.08 -0.04 0.01 
Market-to-book 2.15 1.69 1.08 1.65 2.61 
Special items -0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Returns volatility 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 
Size 5.33 1.76 3.92 5.10 6.56 
Beta 1.09 0.59 0.71 1.05 1.41 
BM -0.54 0.65 -0.96 -0.50 -0.08 
Momentum 0.17 0.48 -0.13 0.10 0.36 
PZ C-score 0.21 0.53 0.00 0.05 0.21 
Bid-Ask spread 3.60 2.14 2.07 3.05 4.61 
CFO volatility 7.56 8.17 3.90 6.10 9.23 
Smoothing -0.62 0.42 -0.81 -0.54 -0.33 
Forecast error 0.29 0.67 0.03 0.07 0.22 
Forecast variability 0.08 0.12 0.02 0.04 0.10 
 
The sample contains 54,389 firm-year observations for the period 1975-2003. Conservatism is the three-year 
average of the firm-year specific proxy of conditional conservatism developed by Callen, Segal and Hope (2009). 
Unless otherwise indicated, the following variables are measured at the end of the fiscal year. Leverage is the ratio 
of interest-bearing debt to total assets. Total accruals equals [(∆Current assets – ∆Cash) – (∆Current liabilities – 
∆Short term debt) – Depreciation]/Average assets. Market-to-book is the market-to-book value of equity ratio. 
Special items equal special items scaled by average total assets. Returns volatility is the three-year average of the 
standard deviation of one year of daily stock returns. Size is the log of the market value of equity. Beta is the slope 
coefficient from the regression of a firm’s monthly excess returns on the monthly value-weighted market excess 
return (from the CRSP monthly index file) over a rolling 60-month (minimum 24 months) window ending in the 
current fiscal year. BM is the log of the book-to-market value of equity ratio. Momentum is the buy and hold return 
for the 11-month period ending one month prior to at the end of the year. PZ C-score is the measure of unconditional 
conservatism developed by Penman and Zhang (2002) that captures the firm’s choice of accounting methods that 
keep the book value net assets relatively low (only available for 43,913 observations). Bid-Ask spread is the average 
daily bid-ask spread over the fiscal year scaled by price, as a percentage. CFO volatility is the standard deviation of 
the firm’s rolling ten-year cash flows from operations scaled by beginning total assets, as a percentage. Smoothing is 
the ratio of earnings volatility to CFO volatility multiplied by -1, where earnings volatility is the standard deviation 
of the firm’s rolling ten-year earnings before extraordinary items scaled by beginning total assets (Smoothing and 
CFO volatility are only available for 25,628 observations). Forecast error is the earnings-per-share forecast error 
measured as the absolute value of the difference between the mean forecast eps and the actual eps, scaled by the 
actual eps. The forecast is taken in the tenth month of the fiscal year from IBES summary data. Forecast variability 
is the standard deviation of the earnings forecasts. We impose a minimum of 3 earnings forecasts per firm-year. 
Forecast error and Forecast variability are only available for 15,388 observations. Forecast error is winsorized at the 
95 percentile. The rest of continuous variables are winsorized annually at the 1 and 99 percentiles to avoid the effect 
of influential observations. 
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TABLE 2 
Construct-validity tests of the conservatism proxy 
 
Regression of decile rankings of Conservatism on several determinants of conservatism 
Dep. var: Conservatism deciles Coeff. t-stat p-val  Coeff. t-stat p-val
Constant 5.14 39.51 0.00  5.11 36.45 0.00 
Leverage 1.64 12.44 0.00  1.44 10.50 0.00 
Total accruals -2.19 -12.27 0.00  -2.20 -11.54 0.00 
Market-to-book -0.18 -8.06 0.00  -0.16 -6.96 0.00 
Special items -3.52 -3.80 0.00  -3.82 -4.36 0.00 
Returns volatility 6.26 2.60 0.01  8.24 3.31 0.00 
Size 0.01 0.46 0.64  0.01 0.56 0.57 
PZ C-score        -0.19 -3.36 0.00 
              
R-sqr 0.03             0.03            
Nobs 54,389      43,913            
The dependent variable is the annual decile rankings of Conservatism. The rest of variables are defined in Table 1. 
Coefficients are based on pooled regressions. The t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered at the firm and 
year level (Petersen, 2009), which are robust to both heteroskedasticity and within-firm serial correlation. All the p-
values are based on two-tailed tests.  
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TABLE 3 
Asset pricing tests - Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics of the factors 
variable Obs Mean St. Dev. Min P50 Max t-stat p-val 
RM–RF 348 0.63 4.48 -23.13 1.01 12.43 2.63 0.01 
SMB 348 0.31 3.27 -16.70 0.28 22.18 1.76 0.08 
HML 348 0.42 3.13 -12.80 0.39 13.80 2.51 0.01 
UMD 348 0.88 4.26 -25.05 0.99 18.40 3.87 0.00 
AMC 348 0.20 1.25 -4.13 0.16 4.20 2.99 0.00 
 
Panel B: Pearson correlation matrix of the factors 
 
 RM–RF SMB HML UMD 
SMB 0.23    
 <.0001    
HML -0.47 -0.35   
 <.0001 <.0001   
UMD 0.01 0.15 -0.13  
 0.85 0.01 0.01  
AMC 0.08 0.12 -0.27 0.13 
 0.12 0.03 <.0001 0.01 
 
The sample covers the months from 1/1/1976 to 12/31/2004. The panels show summary statistics of the three Fama-
French factors, a momentum factor UMD, and a conservatism factor AMC.  RM-RF is excess return on the value-
weighted market portfolio. SML is the value-weighted size-mimicking portfolio return.  HML is the value-weighted 
BM-mimicking portfolio return. UMD is the value-weighted momentum-mimicking portfolio return. RM–RF, SMB, 
HML and UMD are obtained directly from WRDS. AMC (Aggressive minus Conservative) is a factor-mimicking 
portfolio for conditional conservatism. To construct AMC, each month, the value-weighted return of stocks in the 
highest 3 deciles of Conservatism is subtracted from the value-weighted return on stocks in the lowest 3 deciles of 
Conservatism. 
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TABLE 4 
Cross-sectional regressions of future firm returns 
 
Cross-sectional regression of monthly value-weighted future excess returns on firm characteristics and 
conservatism (average coefficients of 348 monthly regressions) 
Ri,t+1 – RF,t+1 = α + β1 Betat + β2 Sizet + β3 BMt + β4 Momentumt + β5 Conservatismt + µt 
 Intercept Beta Size BM Momentum Conservatism
Estimate 1.64 0.07 -0.09 0.26 0.27 -0.04 
t-stat (4.98) (0.41) (1.88) (3.10) (2.91) (4.73) 
p-val <.0.01 0.68  0.06  <.0.01 <.0.01 <.0.01 
Avg. R-sqr 0.04      
Nobs 348      
 
Each month from 1/1/1976 to 12/31/2004, the cross-section of future monthly excess returns is regressed on beta, 
size, BM, Momentum and Conservatism. We match annual estimates of the explanatory variables to monthly returns 
in the next 12 months starting 4 months after the fiscal year end. That is, for December fiscal year ends we collect 
monthly returns from April of year t+1 to March of year t+2. Monthly excess returns are measured in percentages 
and are calculated as the raw stock return less the risk-free rate. Beta is the slope coefficient from the regression of a 
firm’s monthly excess returns on the monthly value-weighted market excess return (from the CRSP monthly index 
file) over a rolling 60-month (minimum 24 months) window ending in the current fiscal year.  Size is the natural log 
of market value of equity measured at the end of the current fiscal year. BM is the natural log of the ratio of book 
value of equity to market value of equity measured at the end of the current fiscal year. Momentum is the buy and 
hold return for the 11-month period ending one month prior to at the end of the year. Conservatism is the monthly 
decile ranks of the three-year average of the firm-year specific proxy of conditional conservatism developed by 
Callen, Segal and Hope (2009). Parameter estimates are time-series averages of the parameters from the 348 
monthly cross-sectional regressions.  The reported t-statistics are calculated from the standard errors of these 
monthly averages following the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure. Continuous variables are winsorized annually 
at the 1 and 99 percentiles. 
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TABLE 5 
Conservatism and future portfolio returns 
 
Time-series regressions of monthly value-weighted portfolio returns on the three Fama-French factors and a 
momentum factor (348 months) 
RP,t – RF,t = α + β1 (RM,t – RF,t) + β2 SMBt + β3 HMLt + β4 UMDt + µt 
 
Conservatism decile Intercept RM–RF SMB HML UMD R-squared 
Panel A:       
Low conservatism: 1 1.02      
 (3.71)      
High conservatism: 10 0.84      
 (3.11)      
       
Hedge: 10 – 1 -0.18      
 (1.95)      
Panel B:       
Low conservatism: 1 0.37 1.04     0.82 
 (3.11) (39.79)     
High conservatism: 10 0.21 1.01    0.80 
 (1.69) (37.73)     
Hedge: 10 – 1 -0.16 -0.03    0.01 
 (1.75) (1.32)       
Panel C:       
Low conservatism: 1 0.28 1.00 0.52 0.13 -0.11 0.92 
 (3.29) (49.73) (20.13) (4.45) (6.04)  
High conservatism: 10 0.03 1.03 0.54 0.33 -0.16 0.93 
 (0.37) (55.48) (22.18) (11.96) (9.17)  
Hedge: 10 – 1 -0.25 0.04 0.01 0.20 -0.05 0.13 
 (2.70) (1.68) (0.44) (6.09) (2.27)   
 
Each month, from 1/1/76 to 12/31/04 (348 months), all firm-years in the sample are ranked into 10 deciles based on 
their Conservatism value. Portfolios of stocks are then formed for each Conservatism decile. The table reports the 
estimated coefficients and t-statistics of portfolio regressions of value-weighted portfolio excess returns on the three 
Fama-French factors and a momentum factor UMD.  RM-RF is excess return on the value-weighted market portfolio. 
Excess returns equal the value-weighted return on the portfolios less the risk free rate.  SML is the value-weighted 
size-mimicking portfolio return.  HML is the value-weighted BM-mimicking portfolio return. UMD is the value-
weighted momentum-mimicking portfolio return. RM–RF, SMB, HML and UMD are obtained directly from WRDS.  
Monthly returns are measured in percentages. Panel A reports the parameter estimates from a regression of the 
portfolio excess returns on an intercept only. Panel B reports the parameter estimates from a regression of the 
portfolio excess returns on an intercept and the market portfolio. Panel C reports the parameter estimates from a 
regression of the portfolio excess returns on an intercept and all the Fama-French factors plus a momentum factor. 
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TABLE 6 
Two-stage cross-sectional regressions 
 
First stage: Portfolio time-series regressions of contemporaneous excess returns on factor returns 
RP,t – RF,t = α + βRM–RF (RM,t – RF,t) + βSMB SMBt + βHML HMLt + βUMD UMDt + βAMC AMCt + µt 
Panel A1: Fama-French 25 Size-BM portfolios. Average factor loadings 
 Intercept  RM-RF  SMB HML UMD  AMC Avg R-sqr 
Coeff. 0.01 1.03 0.49 0.31 -0.03  0.90 
t-stat (0.23) (74.19) (4.97) (3.54) (4.61)   
p-val 0.82 <.0001 <.0001 0.00 <.0001   
GRS-stat 2.59       
GRS p-val <0.01   
Panel B1: Fama-French 25 Size-BM portfolios. Average factor loadings 
Coeff. -0.01 1.04 0.49 0.32 -0.03 0.09 0.91 
t-stat (0.45) (74.67) (4.96) (3.65) (4.87) (3.07)  
p-val 0.66 <.0001 <.0001 0.00 <.0001 0.01  
GRS-stat 2.24       
GRS p-val <0.01       
Panel C1: Fama-French 25 Size-Momentum portfolios. Average factor loadings
Coeff. 0.05 1.04 0.45 0.22 -0.14 0.08 0.90 
t-stat (1.17) (56.25) (5.12) (5.34) (1.71) (2.65)  
p-val 0.25 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.10 0.01  
GRS-stat 4.43       
GRS p-val <0.01       
 
 
Second stage: Average coefficients of 348 monthly cross-sectional regressions of portfolio returns on factor 
loadings 
R P,t – R F,t = α + δ1 βˆ RM–RF + δ2 βˆ SMB + δ3 βˆ HML + δ4 βˆ UMD + δ5 βˆ AMC + µt 
Panel A2: Fama-French 25 Size-BM portfolios 
 Intercept  βRM-RF  βSMB βHML βUMD βAMC  Avg R-sqr 
Coeff. 1.01 -0.30 0.26 0.50 2.07  0.57 
Shanken t-stat (2.47) (0.62) (1.34) (2.68) (2.47)   
p-val 0.01 0.54 0.18 0.01 0.01   
Panel B2: Fama-French 25 Size-BM portfolios 
Coeff. 0.38 0.29 0.29 0.52 3.43 0.46 0.61 
Shanken t-stat (0.69) (0.47) (1.45) (2.73) (3.44) (2.09)  
p-val 0.49 0.64 0.15 0.01 0.00 0.04  
Significance of the increase in R-square with respect to a model without βAMC: p-val: 0.062
Panel C2: Fama-French 25 Size-Momentum portfolios
Coeff. 1.14 -0.38 0.46 -0.35 0.8 0.85 0.69 
Shanken t-stat (2.35) (0.72) (2.32) (1.20) (3.25) (2.92)  
p-val 0.02 0.47 0.02 0.23 0.00 0.00  
Significance of the increase in R-square with respect to a model without βAMC: p-val: 0.058
Panels A1, B1, and C1 present average factor loadings and average R2 of time-series regressions of monthly 
contemporaneous portfolio excess stock returns (stock return minus the risk-free rate) on the three Fama–French 
factors, a momentum factor and the AMC factor.  The Size-BM and Size-Momentum portfolios are downloaded 
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from the Fama-French database at: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. The 
reported t-statistics are calculated from the portfolio-specific standard errors of the average parameters (25 
coefficients on each variable). GRS statistic is the Gibbons et al. (1989) test on whether the estimated intercepts are 
jointly zero. 
Panels A2, B2 and C2 present average coefficients from 348 monthly cross-sectional regressions of excess value-
weighted portfolio returns on portfolio factor loadings (i.e., the slope coefficients from the regressions in Panels A1, 
B1, and C1).  The reported t-statistics are calculated from the standard errors of the average monthly parameter 
estimates following the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure. 
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TABLE 7 
Association of changes in Conservatism with changes in future returns volatility and earnings forecast errors 
 
Panel A: Regression of the change in future returns volatility on change in Conservatism and controls 
Dep. var: ∆ Returns volatility t+1 Coeff. t-stat p-val 
∆ Conservatism t -0.024 -2.38 0.02 
∆ Returns volatility t -0.25 -4.32 0.00 
∆ Beta t -0.07 -2.71 0.01 
∆ Size t -0.01 -0.50 0.62 
∆ BM t 0.10 4.10 0.00 
∆ Momentum t 0.03 1.74 0.08 
∆ Bid-Ask spread t 0.02 2.50 0.01 
∆ CFO volatility t 0.00 0.30 0.77 
∆ Smoothing t -0.03 -1.73 0.08 
Constant 0.01 0.25 0.81 
       
Firm and year cluster Yes     
R-sqr 0.05     
Nobs 25,628     
The dependent variable is the change in the log of  future returns volatility, measured as the standard deviation of 
one year of daily stock returns ending at the end of the fiscal year t+1. The rest of variables are measured at the end 
of year t and are defined in Table 1.  The sample covers the period 1975-2003. 
 
Panel B: Regression of the change analyst forecast errors on change in Conservatism and controls 
Dep. var: ∆ Forecast error Coeff. t-stat p-val 
∆ Conservatism -0.23 -3.85 0.00 
∆ Forecast variability 2.92 12.57 0.00 
∆ Size -0.73 -10.28 0.00 
Constant 0.07 3.11 0.00 
       
Firm and year cluster Yes     
R-sqr 0.07     
Nobs 15,388     
The dependent variable is the change in the log of analysts’ earnings-per-share forecast errors. Forecast errors are 
measured as the absolute value of the difference between the mean forecast eps and the actual eps, scaled by the 
actual eps. The forecasts are taken in the tenth month of the fiscal year from IBES summary data. Forecast 
variability is the standard deviation of the earnings forecasts. We impose a minimum of 3 earnings forecasts per 
firm-year. Size is the log of the market value of equity. The sample covers the period 1975-2003. 
 
In both panels, coefficients are based on pooled regressions. The t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered at 
the firm and year level (Petersen, 2009), which are robust to both heteroskedasticity and within-firm serial 
correlation. All the p-values are based on two-tailed tests. 
